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Cuban Creditors, American Debtors:




In 1959, the political landscape of Cuba and the southeast
United States changed forever. Fidel Castro's Soviet-backed com-
munist revolutionaries seized control of the island paradise
almost overnight in a relatively short-lived insurrection. Many
people lost their lives, and many more lost their property, for in a
communist state, private property does not exist.' Not only did
the new communist government nationalize tangible property, but
Castro's regime also seized notes of debt as well.2 These seizures
continue to affect the legal landscape not only of Cuba, but also
the United States.
Cornelia Hernandez Perez's story is instructive.' In 1958 Cor-
nelia Hernandez Perez's father had on deposit with The First
National City Bank of New York (the "Bank") 300,000 Cuban
pesos. In or around 1962, while the Bank still owed her father the
money, Castro's new communist government nationalized the
Bank.4 In doing so, the Cuban government also repatriated all
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2006, University of Miami School of Law. I
would like to thank Professor Anita Ramasastry for her guidance as well as for
putting me in contact with Joseph Sommer, Esq., of the Federal Reserve Bank in New
York, NY. His insight was truly inspirational and helped to open doors I would have
never known existed.
1. Communist states such as Cuba do not recognize the right to trade in private
property therefore barring private ownership except by appropriation. See Louis
FREDERIC VINDING KRUSE, THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY 9 P. T. Federspiel trans., 1939).
2. See Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 647 (2d Cir. 1984)
(describing Cuban Law No. 78).
3. See Hernandez Perez v. Citibank, N.A., 328 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2004);
see also Defendant Citibank's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and for
Failure to Join Indispensible Parties and Accompanying Memorandum at Law,
Hernandez Perez (No. 04-20910).
4. See Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647 (describing Cuban Law No. 78, which enabled the
Cuban Ministry of Recovery of Misappropriated Property to, inter alia, freeze foreign
bank accounts).
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foreign and domestic banks. The Cuban branch of the Bank was
therefore closed. Cornelia's father died, leaving all of his assets to
her mother. Her mother subsequently died and left her estate to
Cornelia, still a Cuban citizen, and Cornelia's brother, an Ameri-
can citizen living in Miami, Florida. Cornelia's father's certificate
of deposit is alleged to be included in the estate.5
How can Cornelia and her brother retrieve the funds due to
them on their father's certificate of deposit? Are they to recover
from the Bank or from the Banco Nacional de Cuba?6 Have they
simply lost all rights to the funds? The answers to the above ques-
tions are far from black and white. Many legal questions come
into play,7 particularly: First, where is the situs of the debt? Sec-
ond, does the Act of State Doctrine apply?
8
As it exists today, there is no coherent codification of law that
creditors and banks may depend on to determine the correct ave-
nues for handling situations like Cornelia Hernandez-Perez's. If
courts compel the banks to honor the debt, they will have to pay
the obligation created by the secured transaction twice.' If courts
find the banks not liable, people in possession of notes of debt will
have lost their money in United States banks, potentially creating
a damaging precedent to the lauded protections that American
banking laws afford U.S. bank customers. Different courts have
5. See Hernandez Perez, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 1376; see also Defendant Citibank's
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and for Failure to Join Indispensible
Parties and Accompanying Memorandum at Law at 1-3, supra note 3.
6. American banks that had Cuban branches repatriated ultimately credited the
state run bank, Banco Nacional de Cuba, a sum equal to that deposited therein. See,
e.g., Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647.
7. This issue is not unlike many other issues in commercial law: how to allocate
loss between two parties. The allocation of risk in determining loss allocation in this
instance is two-fold: risk of deposit expropriation and risk of asset expropriation.
Debt situs and Act of State Doctrine applicability are instructive as to how the above
risks can be allocated.
8. The doctrine is best explained by the Supreme Court in Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ("Every sovereign state is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit
in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.
Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means
open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.") See also Margaret
E. Tahyar, The Act of State Doctrine: Resolving Debt Situs Confusion, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 594 (1986) ("The act of state doctrine forecloses United States courts from
questioning the validity of a foreign sovereign's acts that occur within its own
territory.").
9. When Cuba repatriated all foreign bank assets, debts were included. Thus,
the banks remitted funds equal to all debts owed by their branches, effectively paying
on the notes. If the banks are found liable on notes by American courts, they would
have to pay double on the notes already honored in Cuba.
2005] CUBAN CREDITORS, AMERICAN DEBTORS 273
ruled in favor of both alternatives. The reality is that due to
Cuba's taking of branch banks' assets, both the banks and the
creditors have been victimized.1" Although the expropriation of
Cuban debts occurred almost fifty years ago, it remains a perti-
nent issue,11 especially considering the current nature of U.S.-
Cuba relations.
This comment will analyze the applicable law as it exists at
the time of publication and will attempt to restate what the law
should be. In addition, it will propose an equitable solution so per-
sons holding notes of deposit from Cuban branches of American
banks will be able to recover their funds, and the American banks
that issued said notes will not be required to honor them if they
have already done so vis-&-vis remittance to the Banco Nacional
de Cuba.'
II. RETRACING THE LAW
A. Cases Involving Cuba
Very few cases that consider the rights and liabilities of liti-
gants arguing over payment of notes of debt that have been expro-
priated by collateral evincing by the Cuban government have
risen to the appellate level. 3 Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A. 14 and Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 5 are the
only two federal cases on point that involve similar scenarios.
10. The court in Day-Gormley Leather Co. v. Nat'l City Bank, 8 F. Supp. 503, 505
(S.D.N.Y. 1934), faced with a similar situation, opined that both the American bank
that had its Russian branch and all assets thereof seized, and the depositor that lost
its funds as a result, were victims.
11. See Hernandez Perez v. Citibank, N.A., 328 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
Cases that have considered this issue exercised federal question jurisdiction under
the Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. § 632 (2005), which provides that: "Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, all suits of a civil nature . . . to which any corporation
organized under the laws of the United States shall be a party, arising out of
transactions involving international or foreign banking... shall be deemed to arise
under the laws of the United States . . . ." Under the Edge Act, the accrual of the
plaintiffs right to sue has to be determined under the law of the controlling parent
bank-the ultimate obligor. Thus, a cause of action against the obligor of a demand
accrues upon demand (in 49 states). The statute of limitations only begins upon
refusal to honor a demand. See, e.g., Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 861
F.2d 1291, 1305 (1st Cir. 1988).
12. See Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 647 (2d Cir. 1984)
(Cuban Ministry of Misappropriated Property ordered U.S. bank to close account and
remit its value and bank complied).
13. The only three cases are Garcia, 735 F.2d 645, Edelmann, 861 F.2d 1291, and
Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5 (N.Y. 1984).
14. 735 F.2d 645.
15. 861 F.2d 1291.
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Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.' 6 was decided differently
than Garcia and Edelmann in New York state court, although it
had an almost identical fact record as the other two cases.
Although each is unique in its details, the general fact pattern
for all three cases can be summarized as follows. Cuban citizens
approached Chase Manhattan Bank branches located in Cuba
with concerns that their liquid assets would not be safe in the
event that Fidel Castro took over the Cuban government.17 On
numerous occasions, Chase officials assured the potential deposi-
tors that their repayment could be made in American dollars at
any Chase Manhattan Bank branch in the world and that they
should deposit their monies with the bank in the interest of safety,
as American banking protections would apply." The Cuban citi-
zens deposited their money as a result. 9 At some point after
deposit, but before a demand was made on the note, the Cuban
government repatriated the Chase Manhattan Bank branches on
the island.20 Cuba then demanded that Chase in turn remit the
proceeds of the various deposits in their exact sums, and Chase
complied.2" At a later date, the promissory note holders demanded
payment from one of Chase Manhattan's branches abroad, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the "home office" in New York.22 Chase
subsequently refused to pay on the notes, and claimed force
majeurel3 as an affirmative defense when brought to suit.
24
Whether the bank remains liable on the debt to the holders of the
promissory notes after repatriation rests on where the situs of the
debt is held to be located.25
16. 463 N.E.2d 5.
17. See generally Garcia, 735 F.2d 645, Edelmann, 861 F.2d 1291, and Perez, 463
N.E.2d 5.
18. See, e.g., Garcia, 735 F.2d at 646-47.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 647.
21. See e.g., Perez, 463 N.E.2d at 6.
22. See id. at 7.
23. Defined as "an occurrence that is: (1) abnormal or unusual, (2) strictly natural
in origin with no human assistance or influence, and (3) inevitable, so that it could not
have been reasonably prevented or provided against by the exercise of ordinary
human foresight." 1 AM. JuR. 2D Act of God § 1 (2004). The term has "also been said
... to have [a] broader meaning than an act of God, assuming the form of such human
agency as governmental intervention resulting from the necessities of war[,]" which
may include Cuban acts of repatriation. Id.
24. See, e.g., Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 861 F.2d 1291, 1297 (1st
Cir. 1988).
25. If the debt was in Cuba at the time of repatriation, American banks can claim
force majeure and the Act of State Doctrine as a defense. If the situs of the debt
remains in the home office of the American bank into whose branch the original
274
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The first determination that must be made to determine the
situs of the debt is whether foreign branches of American banks
are separate entities from their parent banks.26 In contrast to
other American companies that have proliferated overseas in the
form of locally incorporated subsidies, American banks' foreign
branches are not separate legal entities. Under traditional rules
of corporate law, the home bank remains liable for obligations
incurred by its foreign branches. 28 There is, however, strong evi-
dence that the home bank does not remain liable for sovereign or
political risks29 associated with operating under the purview of
foreign laws. Rather, the depositors retain the risk of loss. °
Home banks gaining favorable treatment from the FDIC for
transferring the risk of loss due to sovereign acts of the host coun-
try in their foreign branches seems conclusory, but it is actually
illusory in terms of whether American banks are liable for debts
incurred in Cuba that have been subsequently repatriated. The
terms of the deposit agreement will ultimately decide who
remains liable on the notes of deposit repatriated from Cuban
branches." The fact that the contract ultimately controls explains
the disparity between the federal cases 2 and the New York case. 3
deposit was made, the banks would naturally continue to be liable on the debt at any
of its offices anywhere in the world.
26. Naturally, if a Cuban branch of an American bank is deemed to be a separate
entity, the parent bank can incur no liability for secured transactions entered into by
a branch.
27. See Mark A. Kantor & Francis D. Logan, Deposits at Expropriated Foreign
Branches of U.S. Banks, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 336.
28. See M. Anne Hannigan, United States Home Bank Liability for Foreign Branch
Deposits, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 735, 741.
29. See supra text accompanying note 7.
30. See generally Logan & Connick, Risk Management and the Status of Foreign
Bank Branches Under U.S. Law, in SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISK 223
(M. Gruson & R. Reisner eds., 1984). Foreign branch deposits are exempt from
domestic reserve requirements and interest rate ceilings imposed upon the parent
bank. The Federal Reserve Board recognizes favorable treatment that foreign
branches receive as compensation for the added political risks assumed by the
depositors. The home bank will lose exempt status if the home bank attempts to
assume foreign political risk by guaranteeing payment of foreign deposits in the U.S.
See Hannigan, supra note 28, at 740-41. Furthermore, foreign branches of American
banks generally offer higher interest rates as a result of the greater risks involved
with offshore banking, as foreign branch deposits are not restrained by U.S. interest
rate ceilings. See 12 C.F.R. § 217.1(c)(ii) (2005).
31. See Hannigan, supra note 28, at 754.
32. See, e.g., Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984);
See Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 861 F.2d 1291, 1305 (1st Cir. 1988).
33. See Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5 (N.Y. 1984).
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Garcia34 and Edelmann 5 rest on the proposition that all of the
assurances that the money was safe in the home bank placed lia-
bility at the home bank in the event of force majeure at the branch
where the deposit was initially made.3" Thus, regardless of tradi-
tional banking laws, the parties received the benefit of their bar-
gain when the home bank remained liable for debts incurred at a
foreign branch, not withstanding an act of force majeure. The debt
remained in the home office in New York, not at the branch
itself.37 How is it possible, then, that Perez was decided differ-
ently, as it is factually similar to both Garcia and Edelmann and
was decided under the same laws?
Put simply, the Perez Court found the situs of the debt at the
time of repatriation was only at the branch in which it was cre-
ated, so the Act of State doctrine was therefore applicable.
38
According to the Perez Court, the Act of State doctrine applies
when a foreign sovereign's act amounts to a taking of property
within its own borders.39 A state can only take property that is
within its borders.4" For example, the Cuban government cannot
come to the United States and take a Cuban citizen's car that hap-
pens to be located in America.41 However, if a car happened to be
34. 735 F.2d 645.
35. 861 F.2d 1291.
36. "The purpose of the agreement between Chase and Dominguez and Garcia was
to ensure that, no matter what happened in Cuba, including seizure of the debt,
Chase would still have a contractual obligation to pay the depositors upon
presentation of their CDs . . . Chase was aware of their desire to safeguard their
money and assured them that their funds were protected. Chase 'accepted the risk
that it would be liable elsewhere for obligations incurred by its branch.'" Garcia, 735
F.2d at 650 (citing Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A, 660 F.2d 854, 863
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982)). "The intention of the parties is clear.
The certificates were to be presented at any branch of Chase in any part of the world
except Cuba." Edelmann, 861 F.2d at 1294 (emphasis in original). The parties never
assumed that the debt would be payable in Cuba, for the precise reason for
contracting was to keep the funds outside the jurisdiction of the Cuban government.
37. See Edelmann, 861 F.2d at 1294.
38. See Perez, 463 N.E.2d at 8 ("For purposes of the Act of State doctrine, a debt is
located within a foreign State when that State has the power to enforce or collect it.")
(internal citations omitted). Cuban Law No. 78, Art. 1, gave Cuba the right to collect
the debt: "The Ministry of Recovery of Misappropriated Property is the proper
organization of the Executive Power intended to recover property of any type
[including negotiable and non-negotiable instruments] which has been removed from
the National Wealth and obtain the complete restoration of the proceeds of unjust
enrichments obtained under the cover of the Public Power and to the detriment of
said wealth."). Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647 n.1 (translated from Spanish); see also KRUSE,
supra note 1.
39. See Perez, 463 N.E.2d at 8.
40. See id.
41. In fact, there are billions of dollars in bank accounts in the United States that
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in Cuba, the Cuban government would have full jurisdiction over
the car and could appropriate it if it so desired, even if the car was
property of an American citizen.
As far as application of the Act of State doctrine to a debt, it is
well established that the power to enforce or collect a debt is
dependent on the presence of the debtor.42 The Perez court held
that "if the debtor is present in the foreign State and the debt is
payable there, the foreign sovereign then has power to enforce or
collect it, and a confiscation of that debt amounts to a seizure of
property within that sovereign's borders."43
The Perez debt was payable in Cuba." The Cuban govern-
ment demanded payment on Chase's debt under Cuban law, and
Chase complied by honoring its debt.45 Thus, "Chase paid over the
full amount of its debt [on Perez's note] pursuant to the direction
of the Cuban government, a direction which under the Act of State
doctrine is beyond [the Court's] review .... "-46 Although the
Cuban government demanded payment without possession of the
note, the branch obviously felt the demand was legitimate because
it was subject to Cuban law. Chase Manhattan bank paid the
debt as required by the promissory note, although to Cuba, so the
debt was extinguished and Chase was relieved from liability on a
later demand.
B. Vietnamese and Russian Precedent
The fact that the creditors in Garcia and Edelmann48 relied to
their detriment on assurances that the debt would be payable
outside of Cuba, and therefore safe, cannot reconcile the differ-
ences of opinion between the courts that so ruled and the Perez
court. How did the federal judges somehow determine the debt
belonged to Cuban citizens prior to the Cuban repatriation that remain frozen for the
same proposition. The money was deposited in the United States and there it shall
remain. Cuba cannot claim the private bank accounts of its citizens located in the
United States as its own simply because it so declared in regards to deposits made in
Cuba.
42. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222-223 (1905).
43. Perez, 463 N.E.2d at 8.
44. See id. at 9 (The court did not find the fact that the debt was payable outside of
Cuba as well to be an issue. Although the contract for debt contemplated numerous
situs for payment, it constituted a single obligation to pay).
45. See id.
46. Id. (internal citation omitted)
47. See id. (Payment at one of the places where the note could be redeemed
extinguished the debt at all of the possible situs of debt).
48. Collectively referred to as "the federal cases" or "the federal decisions" for
purposes of this subsection.
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left its original situs simply because the creditors were told that
deposits in Chase Manhattan's Cuban branches were safe? The
answer lies in the reliance on misplaced precedent from the Viet-
nam War and Bolshevik Revolution.
The federal decisions rest most soundly on Vishipco Line v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.49 In Vishipco, the plaintiffs, ten
Vietnamese corporations which maintained Vietnamese Piastre
demand deposit accounts in Chase Manhattan's Saigon branch in
1975, appealed a judgment of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissing their claims against Chase for
payment on various deposit accounts and one certificate of
deposit.5 ° The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.5
From 1966 to 1975, Chase Manhattan Bank operated a
branch office in Saigon.52 The ten corporate plaintiffs were deposi-
tors at that branch.53 After Chase officials in New York concluded
that Saigon was about to fall to the Communists, they closed the
Saigon branch and ceased Vietnamese operations.54 Saigon fell on
April 30, 1975, and the North Vietnamese government seized all
of the branch's assets.5 The plaintiffs fled Vietnam shortly before
the takeover, and after arriving in the United States, demanded
Chase pay the Piastre deposits made in Saigon. The bank refused
to pay, which precipitated the suit.
5 6
The court held Chase liable for the debt incurred at its Saigon
Branch. 7 In doing so, the court stated that the Act of State doc-
trine is limited in application to property within the territorial
jurisdiction of the acting state.58 By closing the Saigon branch
prior to the fall of Saigon and ceasing operations to protect against
any affirmative act of the North Vietnamese expatriating assets
the branch may have had, the debt no longer remained in Viet-
nam.59 In effect, the situs of the debt "sprung" back to the home
49. 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
50. See id. at 856; see also Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1987)
(containing almost the same material facts).
51. See Vishipco, 660 F.2d. at 866.





57. See id. at 866.
58. See Patrick Heininger, Liability of U.S. Banks for Deposits Placed in Their
Foreign Branches, 11 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 903, 963 (1979).
59. See Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 864 (holding that if unsettled local conditions caused
a bank to close a branch, it should inform its depositors of the date when the branch
was to close and allow them to withdraw their deposits, or, if the conditions will not
278
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bank.
The Vishipco Court cites only one case to support its creation
of the "springing" theory of debt situs.60 The springing situs the-
ory of debt originally comes from a New York case, Sokoloff v.
National City Bank.61 The facts in Sokoloff are quite different
than the Vietnam cases.
In 1917, Boris Sokoloff, a Russian Citizen, deposited $30,225
and $883.50 in the National City Bank of New York's ("National")
main office in New York, to be held in National's Petrograd, Rus-
sia, branch in Rubles.2 At some point after returning to Russia,
the creditor asked that his funds be transferred to another bank in
Russia." Due to the archaic Russian bookkeeping system in place
at the time,' coupled with the unrest of the Bolshevik Revolution,
the money was "lost." The American bank would not honor any
demand in its Petrograd branch because it did not know if its
accounts in Kharkoff had been debited in accordance with the
Giro style transfer.6 Before the parties involved could determine
if the funds were actually "transferred," the Communist govern-
ment closed the Petrograd branch and seized whatever assets
remained therein.66
The court in Sokoloff treated the incident as a breach of con-
tract. Sokoloff repeatedly demanded his deposit at the Petrograd
allow such a result, allow them to obtain payment at an alternative location. In the
event that those measures are impossible or only partially successful, the parent bank
should then be liable for deposits which it was unable to return abroad).
60. See Sokoloff v. Nat'l City Bank, 164 N.E. 745 (N.Y. 1928) (the only precedent
for the springing situs theory).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 746-47.
63. See id.
64. Russian banks employed the Giro system, which is a manner of bookkeeping
that operates, for example, as follows:
Upon the receipt of the order we debit the client's account to the
amount which he requested to be transferred. Our record and our
account with the State Bank is credited with the same amount.
Then the State Bank, upon receipt of our instructions, perform a
similar operation; they debit our account and credit the account of
the Kharkoff Branch with the same amount. They send a similar
instruction to their Kharkoff Branch, where the system of debits
and credits is repeated. Our part of the transfer is complete when
we sent out our instructions to the State Bank. The rest of this
transfer would be performed in the State Bank Petrograd or the
State Bank Kharkoff or the Kharkoff Mutual Credit Society.
Sokoloff, 164 N.E. at 747.
65. See id. at 748.
66. See id. at 749.
67. See id. (It is important to note that the contract was entered into in New York
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branch while the transfer was pending and was refused. 8 The
court held that because of the bookkeeping system, no transfer
was ever made except on paper. 9 Thus, the bank breached its
contract which it entered into in New York.
Although the Sokoloff Court made note of the fact that the
bank did not breach its contract willfully,70 which would normally
make the Act of State doctrine applicable (thereby stripping the
home office of liability), it found the home bank liable on the debt
for breach of contract.71 The United States did not recognize the
Soviet Union as legitimate, so its governmental acts such as seiz-
ing property were not considered an act of the state. The Act of
State doctrine defense, therefore, could be utilized as a defense. 2
Thus, the home bank remained liable for its breach of contract, for
at the moment of breach, the debt "sprung" back to the home
bank.73
III. RECONCILING THE LAW
Although paramount, the answers to the basic questions,
"Where is the situs of the debts incurred in Cuban branches of
American banks?" and "Can banks use the Act of State doctrine as
an affirmative defense against adjudicating liability?" are not
answered easily. Each case propounding the law is distinguisha-
ble from the others. All of the existing case law was decided
extremely narrowly,7 4 pertinent only to the facts included therein.
specifically with the home bank, not in Petrograd. Because the contract was made
between Sokoloff and National's home bank in the U.S., it remains liable for the
action of breach by its foreign branch); see also Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
463 N.E.2d 5 (N.Y. 1984).
68. See Sokoloff, 164 N.E. at 749.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 750.
72. See id. at 749-50.
73. See id. at 750.
74. The previously mentioned, federally decided Cuban cases relied on the fact
that the bank branch officers made oral representations that the deposits would be
safe as backed by American funds in American banks. See Garcia v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984); Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 861 F.2d 1291 (1st Cir. 1988). The previously discussed Vietnamese
cases operated as such because the bank branches closed prior to their assets being
repatriated. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2nd
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164
(6th Cir. 1987). Sokoloff turned on a very specific system of bookkeeping used prior to
the Communist takeover of Russia that has absolutely no implication today. See
Sokoloff, 164 N.E. 745.
280
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A. Situs of the Debt
The situs of the debt decides whether the Act of State doctrine
applies, thus determining how the risk of loss on expropriated
debts is allocated. Debt situs turns on choice of law determina-
tions. As of the time of publication, no authority exists that truly
answers where the situs of the debt deposited in Cuban branches
of American banks prior to repatriation is located. Some of the
authority on point holds that the debt "sprang" to the home bank
at the instance that demand became impossible at the branch
office in Cuba.7" These cases rest solely on the fact that deposits
were expressly made for payment outside of Cuba to protect assets
in the face of the pending revolution. On the other hand, Perez"6
did not contemplate the fact the banks affirmatively told creditors
their deposits would be safely payable outside of Cuba. Thus, the
court held the situs of the debt remained in Cuba at the time of
repatriation.77 As a result, one issue remains unresolved. The
Perez court held that no springing occurred because it was payable
outside of Cuba, as well as within Cuba.78 The very fact that the
debt was payable inside of Cuba brought the debt under Cuba's
jurisdiction. In contrast, Garcia79 and Edelmann0 held the debt
sprung back to the home office as a result of repatriation because
it was payable outside of Cuba.
Choice of law issues and the situs of a debt are easily cleared
up by using an incidents of the debt analysis."' An incidents of the
debt analysis takes various factors into account when determining
debt situs: jurisdiction over the debtor, place of payment, intent
as to governing law, and currency denomination.82
Understanding the purposes underlying the Act of State doc-
trine is helpful in recognizing why an incidents of the debt analy-
75. See Garcia, 735 F.2d at 741; Edelmann 861 F.2d 1291.
76. 463 N.E.2d 5 (N.Y. 1984).
77. See id.
78. See id. at 13 (The court reasoned that only if a debt is not payable at all in the
confiscating state would the act of state doctrine be inapplicable to confiscation
because in such situations the foreign sovereign has no power to enforce or collect the
debt).
79. 735 F.2d 645.
80. 861 F.2d 1291.
81. "The proper test for determining situs is where the incidents of debt, as a
whole, place it." Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985); see
also Libra Bank Ltd. V. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870, 881-84
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Tahyar, supra note 8, at 612-13 (explaining four factors to be
considered in the Incidents of Debt Analysis).
82. See Tahyar, supra note 8, at 612-13.
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sis clears up the current confusion about Cuba's debt fiasco. 3 The
Act of State doctrine was originally an idea to respect the sover-
eign authority of other nations." In 1964, however, the Supreme
Court shifted the basis for the doctrine away from respect for sov-
ereign authority to constitutional principals of separation of pow-
ers.8 5  However, the original principles of comity among
independent nations still play a role in the propagation of the Act
of State doctrine.8 6 Thus, when determining whether the Act of
State doctrine applies, courts must continue, at least as part of the
analysis, to look to the foreign sovereign's position in the matter.
The situs of a debt is about as "intangible a concept known to exist
in the law[,]"87 so the incidents of the debt analysis necessarily
requires sovereign authority to play a role in determining Act of
State doctrine applicability. Therefore, applying the Act of State
Doctrine makes an incidents of the debt analysis a workable
framework for determining the situs of debt in cases of Cuban
expropriation of debts in United States bank branches located in
Cuba at the time of seizure.
When utilizing an incidents of the debt analysis, the situs of
the debt is determined by the "foreign state's reasonable expecta-
tions" of dominion over the debt.88 This analysis takes into
83. The applicability of the Act of State doctrine as an affirmative defense in
Cuban debt expropriation suits will be addressed in the subsequent section.
84. See Tahyar, supra note 8, at 606.
85. For example, in the United States Supreme Court case, Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Cuban government confiscated sugar from a boat docked in a
Cuban port. In order that Cuba would permit the ship to leave port, the American
broker executed new contracts with interveners appointed by the Cuban government.
After its expropriation, the sugar was exported from Cuba. The pre-revolutionary
owners of the sugar attached the proceeds of the sale of the sugar. The court adhered
to the Act of State doctrine not on grounds that Cuban sovereignty was to be
respected, rather that it was not the Judiciary's place to determine issues of foreign
policy as it would constitute an encroachment on the Executive power. See Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
86. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976)
(holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not extend to the purely
commercial activities of nations); see also First Nat'l City v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
406 U.S. 759 (1972) (holding that when the application of the act of state doctrine
would not advance the interest of American foreign policy, the doctrine will not be
applied by the Court). See also Tahyar, supra note 8, at 606 ("In the two act of state
cases subsequent to Sabbatino, the Court has failed to reach a majority consensus
concerning the doctrine's purpose.").
87. Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
88. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional De Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870,
884 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (The court reasoned that the foreign sovereign's reasonable
expectations are the "root notion" underlying the Act of State doctrine).
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account the four criterion utilized by an incidents of the debt anal-
ysis.89 Since the situs of the debt is based on whether the foreign
sovereign had reasonable expectations of dominion over the debt,
the choice of law to employ naturally follows the same reasoning.
If the foreign sovereign expects to have dominion over the debt, its
laws should control.
The reasoning is circular, but important. Act of State doc-
trine applicability is predicated on the situs of the debt, which
turns on the choice of law. The situs of the debt determines the
choice of law to be employed. Thus, you cannot have one without
the other. The issue becomes less confusing by effectually dis-
sipating any need for a choice of law analysis, for such a determi-
nation rests on the situs of the debt.90
Persons or entities depositing funds in foreign branches of
American banks should not expect to be protected by American
banking laws because of the added risk. Thus, the law of the for-
eign entity where the branch is located should apply because that
foreign jurisdiction has a reasonable expectation of dominion over
the debt. Garcia91 and Edelmann92 are specific cases where the
sole purpose of depositing the funds was to take advantage of the
stability American banking provides. 3 There will likely be future
suits where creditors sue American banks for payment on notes of
deposit made in their Cuban branches without the oral safety
guarantees the courts found in Garcia94 and Edelmann 5
Therefore, Edelmann and Garcia cannot be controlling due to
the extremely narrow basis of their holdings. Future litigants also
cannot rely on the seemingly similar cases Vishipco6 and Trihn,97
which arose out of the fall of Saigon. Since the Vietnamese
89. See Tahyar, supra note 8, at 612-13.
90. Imagine, for example, a situation where Cuban law holds that the debt
remained in Cuba and United States law concurrently held that the debt remained in
the home bank. What would the implication be if Cuba reasonably expected dominion
over the debt, yet a United States court held that U.S. law applied? How could a court
determine if the Act of State doctrine applied without affronting the original notion of
respect for acts of individual sovereign action? It would create a situation where U.S.
law required that the situs of the debt be in the United States, even though every
indication pointed to the fact that the debt remained in Cuba. The only way to reach
such a conclusion is to undermine the very foundation of the Act of State doctrine.
91. 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984).
92. 861 F.2d 1291 (1st Cir. 1988).
93. See generally Garcia, 735 F.2d 645; Edelmann, 861 F.2d 1291.
94. 735 F.2d 645.
95. 861 F.2d 1291.
96. 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
97. 850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1987).
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branches closed prior to repatriation of their assets, Vishipco and
Trihns5 are easily distinguishable because the Cuban branches of
American banks remained open at the time of seizure.99 There-
fore, not only is the reliance of the Edelmann and Garcia courts on
Vishipco °0 and Trihn misplaced, 1 1 those two cases are inapplica-
ble to the Cuban fact pattern as may arise.
Sokoloff"°' similarly does not apply. Although both the bank
and the depositor were victims of the Bolshevik Revolution, the
court attributed the risk of loss to the home bank.10 3 However, one
major distinction exists. The debtor in Sokoloff repeatedly
demanded payment prior to Russian expropriation.0 0 For that
reason, the breach of contract the Sokoloff court contemplated
0 5
occurred prior to any act of state that would extinguish liability on
the debt. Just as the debt "sprung" to the home office when the
Vietnamese branches were voluntarily closed, so too did the debt
"spring" back to the home bank when one of its branches volunta-
rily breached its contract with the creditor.
0 6
The only case truly on point, then, is Perez."°7 Although it is a
New York case decided under New York law, Perez is entirely cor-
rect that at the instant the Cuban government repatriated the
creditor's funds by making a demand on the notes of deposit, the
debt had to reside in Cuba,0 8 and was extinguished upon payment
to the Cuban government. 10 9 The very fact the Cuban government
was able to seize the debt in Cuban pesos in Cuba demonstrates a
fulfillment of the four-pronged incidents of the debt analysis.
110
Therefore, absent any contemplation between the contracting par-
98. See Vishipco, 660 F.2d 854; Trinh, 850 F.2d 1164.
99. See Edelmann, 861 F.2d 1291; Garcia, 735 F.2d 645; Perez v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5 (N.Y. 1984).
100. 660 F.2d 854.
101. The fact that the Vietnamese branches ceased operations prior'to the fall of
Saigon meant that there was no possible way the debt resided in Vietnam at the time
of repatriation. Such a difference in circumstance distinguishes Vishipco completely
from the cases arising in Cuba and cannot logically apply because the Cuban banks
were open at the time their assets were taken.
102. 164 N.E. 745 (N.Y. 1928).




107. 463 N.E.2d 5 (N.Y. 1984).
108. As mentioned above, Garcia and Edelmann were special cases with specific
fact patterns that are not necessarily representative of all situations of repatriated
debt in Cuban branches of American banks.
109. See Perez, 463 N.E.2d 5.
110. See Tahyar, supra, note 8.
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ties that the situs of the debt would be otherwise, persons or enti-
ties demanding payment on notes repatriated by the Cuban
government must do so with the understanding that the debt was
properly located in Cuba when the Cuban government demanded
payment. 1 '
B. Applicability of the Act of State Doctrine
Once it is determined the debt remained in Cuba at the time
of repatriation, the question remains whether the Cuban seizures
were valid. If they were valid, the Act of State doctrine would pre-
sumably apply, extinguishing the banks' liability. If the seizures
were invalid, the banks retained liability for the debts to the
debtor and should pay on demand. 112 If the latter scenario
prevails, the banks decision to remit funds equal to the debts held
to Cuba is a non-issue. This section will explore the applicability
of the Act of State doctrine both under the restrictions of the
Helms-Burton Act' and not, as statutory restrictions against the
implementation of the doctrine may come into play in the future.
i. Act of State Doctrine Notwithstanding Helms-Burton
Where the situs of the debt remains, and thus, choice of law
depends on the sovereign's jurisdiction over the debtor."4 In Cor-
nelia Hernandez's case, for example, if Cuba had no jurisdiction
over the bank at the time, First National City Bank of New York
cannot now claim the Act of State doctrine as a defense. Rather,
the bank is stuck with foolishly making the act of remitting its
own funds to Cuba in an amount equal to that of Hernandez's
father's deposit. In a U.S. court, for purposes of the Act of State
doctrine, it would be seen almost as if National voluntarily
handed funds to Cuba, which in no way extinguishes a debt owed
to someone else. In fact, the very reason that Citibank closed its
doors prior to North Vietnamese takeover and expatriation of
bank assets precluded Citibank from asserting an Act of State
111. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) ("In a
real sense, there are three partners to every civil marriage: two willing spouses and
an approving state.").
112. If the debtor transferred the promissory note, the banks would thereby be
liable on the debt on the note to the holder thereof.
113. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act ("LIBERTAD"), 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6021, 6091 (2000).
114. See Colleen R. Courtade, J.D., Annotation, Situs of Debt or Property for
Purposes of Act of State Doctrine, 77 A.L.R. FED. 293 § 5[a] (1986) (noting the
utilization of an incidents of the debt analysis). See supra text accompanying note 83.
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doctrine defense in Vishipco.115 However, Cuban banks were not
closed when Cuba repatriated their branch assets.1 6
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Vishipco"7 and the
narrow federal cases dealing with demands made on repatriated
Cuban notes of deposit, there is existing law that can clear up the
confusion left in the wake of the strikingly easily distinguishable
cases heretofore relied upon when adjudicating similar litigation.
Where the debtor was a German state, the court in Federal
Republic of Germany v. Elicofon' 8 held that, for purposes of the
Act of State doctrine, the situs of an annuity obligation was Ger-
many. The heirs of a former Grand Duke of an area that was once
one of the East German states claimed the German government
owed an annuity obligation to them for the loan of art works made
by the Grand Duke. An act of the German state, which allegedly
owed the annuity obligation, terminated all contract rights of for-
mer sovereigns and their families." 9 The German government
claimed the Act of State doctrine precluded the court from review-
ing its act, and therefore prevented adjudication of the Grand
Duke's heirs' claims. It is well settled, the court said, that where
the confiscated property consists of debt, the situs of the debt is
the debtor's domicile. 2 ' The debtor, the East German state, was
located in Germany at the time of the confiscation, so the court
held the situs of the annuity obligation was Germany.12 Thus, the
Act of State doctrine barred adjudication in U.S. courts.
It is factually settled that the Cuban branches of American
banks remained open for business at the time the debts were con-
fiscated by the Cuban Government.122 The debtor, the Cuban
branches wherein the debts were made, was located in Cuba at
the time of the confiscation and under Cuban jurisdiction. Cuba
115. 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); see also Trinh v.
Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1987).
116. See generally Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 861 F.2d 1291 (1st
Cir. 1988); Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984); Perez
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5 (N.Y. 1984).
117. 660 F.2d 854.
118. 536 F. Supp. 813 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd sub nom. Kunstsammlungen Zu
Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
119. See Elicofon, 536 F. Supp at 815.
120. See id. (The jurisdiction of a debtor's domicile naturally would fulfill the four-
pronged incidents of the debt analysis, absent any contractual provision to the
contrary).
121. See id.
122. See generally Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 861 F.2d 1291 (1st
Cir. 1988); Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984); Perez
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5 (N.Y. 1984).
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had jurisdiction over the debtor, demanded payment in Cuban
currency in Cuba, and no contractual provisions contemplated any
specific governing law. As a result, the contract defaults to Cuban
law, placing the situs of the debt in Cuba. Thus, the Act of State
doctrine bars adjudication in the United States and the banks
should not be liable twice on the notes of debt in the absence of
any legislation preventing the use of the doctrine.
123
ii. Act of State Doctrine Under Helms-Burton
President Clinton signed the Helms-Burton bill into law on
March 12, 1996.1" Titles I, II, and IV of Helms-Burton 121 were
effectuated, yet Title III is not yet implemented. 26 Irving explains
why Title III is not yet law:
Language in the Helms-Burton Act allows the president
'suspension authority,' defined as the ability to suspend the
effective date of Title III's implementation for a six-month
period. This authority, which can be renewed periodically,
was utilized by President Clinton for the remainder of his
presidency. During George W. Bush's 2000 presidential
campaign, his platform included a promise to rescind the
suspensions that Clinton had repeatedly requested and
been granted. One could argue that the pledge to finally
implement Title III of the Helms-Burton Act helped Bush
win the key state of Florida, and thus the presidency. Since
being elected, however, he has reneged on his promise by
consistently requesting six-month suspensions of Title III.
It remains, at the moment, a mere threat, but one that is
resoundingly spurned by the international community.1 27
In the event that Title III is ever implemented, it will have colos-
sal implications to issues of debt liability on expatriated Cuban
notes of deposit.
Section 6082(a)(6) of the Helms-Burton Act, Inapplicability of
Act of State Doctrine, states: "No court of the United States shall
123. This assertion does not apply to the specific facts and narrow holdings as they
appeared in Garcia and Edelmann. Those cases would be controlling in the event of
litigation where the exact same factors came into play. The law as posited is meant
only to apply the general factual pattern involving repatriated debts from Cuban
branches of American banks.
124. See David 0. Irving, Note, i Viva Helms-Burton?: An Alternative to Continued
U.S. Sanctions of Cuba and Threats to Third-Party Nationals, 19 CoNN. J. INT'L L.
631 (2004).
125. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021, 6091 (2000).
126. See Irving, supra note 124.
127. Id. at 633-634.
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decline, based upon the act of state doctrine, to make a determina-
tion on the merits .... ,,128 Thus, Helms-Burton effectually
destroys the Act of State doctrine as it may be applicable to deter-
mining if an American bank remains liable on a debt incurred in a
Cuban branch that was subsequently repatriated.129 American
banks, notwithstanding the fact that they already paid their debts
on the note to Cuba, would unequivocally be liable to creditors
demanding remittance in the United States under Title III of the
Helms-Burton Act.
The potential of Title III of Helms-Burton becoming law fur-
ther blurs any coherent attempt at determining how the law truly
applies to Cuban debts. Without passage, the law supports the
application of the Act of State doctrine, so the banks should there-
fore not be held liable on repatriated debts. 3 ° If ever imple-
mented, the Act of State doctrine could not be employed and the
banks will be forced to honor notes of debt twice. Regardless, the
outcome is the same: One innocent party wins, and one innocent
party loses. The only certainty is that Castro will prevail, poten-
tially gaining possession of millions of dollars of other people's
intangible property, for just as the Day-Gormley Leather Co. court
noted in 1934, "both the depositor and the bank [are] victims." 3'
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Cuban-American relations remain a hot topic in American
politics. Any court facing the task of adjudicating Cuban debt lia-
bility must be required to take policy considerations into account.
This is a difficult task. If a court holds the Act of State doctrine
applicable, as argued herein, many individuals will suffer harm at
the hands of Fidel Castro by the pen of an American judge. If
Title III of Helms-Burton is ever implemented, American courts
will force American banks to pay debts twice. This conundrum
probably explains the Garcia and Edelmann holdings; if protec-
tion of one party where both are victims is the only option, courts
will naturally be more sympathetic to individuals than giant
banks.
128. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(6) (2000); See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
129. See Irving, supra note 124, at 647 ("Under the act of state doctrine, then, it
seems that the U.S. would have no right to enact laws having the effect of intervening
with Cuba's confiscation of property located within Cuba itself. The doctrine clearly
conflicts with Helms-Burton.")
130. See id.
131. Day-Gormley Leather Co. v. Nat'l City Bank, 8 F. Supp. 503, 505 (S.D.N.Y.
1934).
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As a solution, this Comment proposes two different avenues
for a remedy in an effort to quash policy concerns that place Amer-
ican courts in a no-win situation. Under the proposed solutions,
regardless of whether the banks are held liable, the depositors will
receive their credit due and the banks will only have to pay the
debt once.
If a court finds the American parent-bank liable on a repatri-
ated note from Cuba, the bank will suffer the inequity of having to
pay the debt twice - once to Cuba after the Communist Revolu-
tion, and once again to the possessor of the original certificate of
deposit. A more equitable solution would be to allow the banks to
recover damages directly from the Banco Nacional de Cuba, to
whom the banks originally paid the debts. To do this, the banks
could cross-claim and obtain a writ of garnishment against seized
Cuban interests in America.
There is a total freeze on Cuban assets in the United States,
both governmental and private, including bank accounts held in
U.S. banks. 132 Blocked deposits of funds are held in interest-bear-
ing accounts. 33 There are four seized bank accounts belonging to
the Banco Nacional de Cuba alone.' There is absolutely no rea-
son why banks should not be allowed to garnish funds being paid
into those frozen accounts. If the banks are held liable, it must be
because the Act of State Doctrine did not apply. Therefore, Ameri-
can courts would not be barred from deciding on the merits of the
Cuban repatriation of American assets.
A writ of garnishment has been used against Cuba before. In
Alejandre v. Telephonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc.,'3
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals executed a writ of garnish-
ment against, among others, Citibank, AT&T, Sprint, Worldcom,
and MCI to satisfy a $178 million judgment against Cuba and the
Cuban Air Force for shooting down the plane of three American
citizens. Apparently, prior to 1994, the Cuban telephone system
was operated by a wholly-owned company of the Cuban Ministry
of Communications. 36 Many U.S. telephone companies signed
Operating Agreements with the Cuban telephone company1 7 to
132. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (2005).
133. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.205 (2005).
134. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons 49 (Feb. 15, 2005), available at httpJ/
www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/tl lsdn.pdf.
135. 183 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).
136. See id. at 1280.
137. The company was "Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba." See id.
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provide international telephone service between Cuba and the
United States.'38 Subsequently, the Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control granted the U.S. telecom compa-
nies licenses under 22 U.S.C. § 6004(e)(3)(A) and 31 C.F.R.
§§ 515.418(a), 515.542(c), permitting them to make payments
under the law as required by the Operating Agreements.
13 9
Normally, property of a foreign state in the United States is
immune from garnishment.14 0 However, if that foreign property in
the United States is used for commercial activity, it is subject to
garnishment.' Because the debts the U.S. telephone companies
owed to Cuba were the result of commercial activity, the judgment
was satisfied out of those funds.14 The same can easily be
extended to writs of garnishment banks would utilize after being
held liable on the repatriated notes.
This logically extends to the bank accounts holding monies
owed to the Cuban Government both before and after seizure. If
there are funds in the seized accounts that were either the fruit of
a commercial activity or have been deposited therein due to com-
mercial activity after the account was blocked, those funds should
be available for garnishment to satisfy judgments against Cuba
for wrongfully demanding payment on a certificate of deposit and
effectually taking funds from American banks.
If a court does not find the bank liable on the debt, the credi-
tor must have some recourse. The answer is very simple. When
suing on the note, creditors can simply name the Banco Nacional
de Cuba as a defendant. If the American bank is not liable on the
note, the Banco Nacional de Cuba must be, as it assumed all
rights and liabilities incorporated with the foreign branch when it
repatriated its assets. 4 3 The Banco de Nacional de Cuba simply
stepped into the shoes of the bank it repatriated the debt from and
should be accountable for payment. The method for attaching
funds can be employed in the same way as the above.
138. See id. at 1281.
139. See id.
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1999).
141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7) (1999).
142. See Alejandre v. Telephonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc., 183 F.3d
1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999).
143. See Wollman v. Gross, 646 F.2d 1306, 1308 (8th Cir. 1981) ("If the Government
voluntarily chooses to stand in the shoes of another, it should assume all rights and
liabilities existing.").
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V. CONCLUSION
Simply put, as the law stands now, Fidel Castro has been able
to deny the very property rights America holds so dearly. The vic-
tims of a tyrannical seizure of property have been left to quibble
among themselves to try to protect their own interests. Banks
lose when they are found liable and individual people lose when
they are not. One thing remains unmistakably clear: Fidel Cas-
tro has won. This, however, need not be the case.
Whatever the outcome courts may reach, be it home bank lia-
bility or not, there is still an avenue for hope. The banks need not
pay twice, and the individual creditors need not be left out in the
cold, holding worthless pieces of paper evincing a debt owed to
them, but paid to the Cuban government. American courts need
only follow their own precedent and garnish the multitude of
funds belonging to Cuba either sitting in seized accounts or paya-
ble to Cuba itself. It has been done before, and can be done again.
In this fashion, Cuba will be compelled to compensate those par-
ties it took property from. Forcing Cuba to compensate both the
banks and the creditors is nothing less than an equitable solution
to an inequitable problem.
